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Walter M. Weber's remarks present a brief but revealing exposition 
of the right.to·life argument against legal recognition of .the "right to 
die." I say "revealing" because while t hese remarks present the con· 
servative view perhaps as clearly as it has been set forth 80 far, they 
exhibit particularly vividly its major flaw. While I do think that the 
right·to.life argument against recognition of t he right to die is to be 
taken seriously, and that we can learn much from the concerns it 
attempts to express, the lengths to which it is carried here are dangerously 
alarmist. 
First, however, a bit of attention to the background conceptual struc· 
ture of this argument is necessary. Weber is quite correct in claiming 
that the "right to die" is an ambiguous term. It has two principal 
meanings: Sometimes it is used to refer to a (passive) right to refuse 
medical treatment in otherwise fatal conditions, while at other times 
it is used, variously, to refer to what Weber calls a "right to choose 
death" or a "true right to die," presumably including an (active) right 
to kill oneself, to undergo voluntary active euthanasia, or to receive 
physician assistance in suicide. The right to die in the former, limited 
sense is already protected by law; it is the latter practices also included 
under ''the right to die" to which Weber is opposed. 
Given this ambiguity, we must consider whether there is a difference 
between the passive and active senses of the "right to die" sufficient 
to warrant such a striking distinction in the law. Employing the tra· 
ditional Catholic principle of double effect, Weber claims that the passive 
right to refuse treatment "involves a decision how to live one's life," 
While the active right to die "involves a decision Mt to live one's life." 
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But this is the sort of semantic quibble that has given the casuistic 
app1ications of this principle such a bad name. The choice to refuse 
treatment in an otherwise fatal condition is not simply a choice about 
"how to live one's life," where death is a "foreseen but unintended 
outcome"; it is a choice to take certain steps that one knows and expects 
will result in one's own death. To refuse treatment in an otherwise 
fatal condition is to choose to die, even though one "would not choose 
to die in the absence of the condition, and no amount of semantic 
obfuscation can conceal this fact. It is nol like electing to drive on a 
freeway during rush hour, in Weber's simile, and thus, as he claims, 
different from electing to drive off a cliff. Refusing treatment in a 
medical condition that will otherwise be fatal is like driving on the 
freeway when one's brakes and steering mechanism are completely 
nonfunctional: The outcome,just as in driving off the cliff, is inevitable 
death. The point of the distinction Weber is trying to make is to "excuse" 
from any moral taint of "choosing to die" those who, in fatal conditions, 
refuse further treatment; however, they do choose to die, in conditions 
they regard as worse than continuing to live, and must be credited 
with responsibility for this choice. 
Weber is also correct in claiming that at present, the law clearly 
recognizes only a passive right to die- that is, a right to refuse treatment. 
!he status of suicide, among the components of an active right to die, 
IS less clear; contrary to popular belief, suicide is not against the law, 
though it is also not against the law to prevent a suicide and it is 
against the law to assist in or abet one. The law does not recognize a 
right to die in the sense of a right to seek or receive active voluntary 
euthanasia (though it does recognize the right to passive voluntary 
euthanasia in the form of refusing life-prolonging medical treatment), 
nor does it permit physician-assisted suicide or aid in dying. Weber is 
furthermore correct in claiming that for the law to recognize these 
latter, active rights. as indeed it should, would involve a major trans-
formation. But it is crucial to see that his account of what this trans-
formation would involve is seriously misguided. If Weber's predictions 
of the legal changes that recognition of a true right to die would ne-
cessitate were correct, they would provide very strong reasons for not 
recognizing such a right; however, these predictions, as we shall see, 
are themselves quite erroneous. 
This brings us to the central element of Weber's argument. It is a 
version of the "slippery-slope" argument characteristically employed 
by the right-to-life opposition in the euthanasia dispute; here, it appears 
in a legally cloaked. version.} This slippery-slope argument warns that 
if an active right to die were recognized, this would force many changes 











indefensible deaths and would permit a wide range of killing. Hence, 
the argument concludes, recognition of a true right to die would lead 
to a legally permitted. moral holocaust, and 80 cannot be allowed. 
Weber provides details of how this legal slippery slope would work. 
If an active right to die, understood as a right to suicide or as a right 
to aid in dying, were recognized as a constitutional right,2 he thinks, 
it would apply not only to tenninally ill adults, as originally intended, 
because fundamental constitutional rights in general cannot be denied 
without strict scrutiny under the equal-protection clause, it would also 
apply to mature minors and to incompetent individuals, including infants, 
those with mental illness, retarded people, and confused or senile elderly 
individuals. The "young woman tragically disappointed in love, the 
middle-aged. man who has lost his family and whose career has been 
destroyed, the depressed. teen, and the ... severely disabled [person]," 
be quotes another source as saying, would "share equally in the right 
to kill themselves." Once unleashed, he claims, the right to die would 
have to be extended. to everyone, and there would be no way to protect 
persons from bringing death upon themselves. Any person would be 
quaranteed the right to choose between life and death 88 "two merely 
elective courses." Furthermore, Weber continues, this would impose 
new obligations upon professional counselors, including physicians, 
therapists, and perhaps attorneys, to provide their clients with infor-
mation sufficient to make an informed choice between the options of 
life and .death. It would expose police officers and firefighters to legal 
liability for preventing or rescuing suicides. It would make it impossible 
for mental health officials to commit mentally ill persons at risk of 
suicide to institutions to protect them. Finally, it would play havoc 
with the homicide laws: Consent of the victim would become a defense 
in homicide prosecutions, and this defense would be available even in 
cases where minors or incompetent persons were "assumed." on the 
basis of substituted judgment to have desired death. Suicide and homicide 
would become rampant, and there would be no legal line to draw to 
get the killing to stop. 
While any attempt to foresee the legal and social consequences of 
coming to recognize an important new right is surely to be applauded, 
Weber's predictions are wholly without foundation in any realistic 
appraisal of the law. Central to his claim is the assumption that an 
active right to die (i.e., a right to suicide) could not be limited to dying, 
terminal patients. Weber correctly asserts that under the equal·protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, strict 
scrutiny must be applied to any legislative attempt to restrict funda-
mental constitutional rights, and will be struck down unless narrowly 
tailored to further a compelling government interest. But he also thinks 
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that there is no reason why any distinction between persons who are 
tenninally ill and those who are not could survive such scrutiny, and 
hence that if the right to die is a right of terminally ill persons, it must 
be a right of all. In effect, the state would be obliged to allow or supPOrt 
anyone's suicide. 
But there is a simple , direct answer available to this unfounded 
claim-an answer initially articulated in Quinlan and reiterated. and 
developed in many later cases, including Conroy and the trio of cases 
decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court on June 24 , 1987 (Farrell 
Peter, and Jobes). Quinlan asserted. that there is a compelling sta~ 
interest in the preservation of life - and. thus, an interest that survives 
the strict scrutiny test required for the abridgment of fundamental 
constitutional rights- but t hat this interest wanes "as the prognosis 
dims." One's right to die is overridden by the state's compelling interest 
in the preservation of life (or, as in the later cases, the preservation 
of cognitive life), but the state's interest recedes as the medical likelihood 
of recovery becomes increasingly small, and one's right to die emerges 
from this eclipse. This is not to say that the state has no obligation to 
protect the terminally ill, nor that it may kill them. Rather, it is to 
say that these persons' right to choose an earlier, easier death if they 
wish outweighs the state's interest in preserving life or cognitive life 
where there is no longer any realistic hope of recovery. This is not just 
a right some people have; it is a right we all have, but one that comes 
into play only when we come to the end of our lives. 
Thus Weber is right in seeing that such a criterion would not restrict 
the right to die to terminally ill adults only, though its spread would 
be much more limited than he thinks. For instance, the prognosis may 
be very dim for newborns with very severe deficits; in cases where the 
infants cannot survive, they would under this criterion have a right 
to active, humane assistance in death, rather than simply being "allowed 
to die." Similarly, the catastrophically disabled person for whom the 
prognosis for medical recovery is equally dim- Elizabeth Bouvia is 
the most celebrated example- also has (as Judge Compton argued in 
his concurring opinion) an active right to die, and to be supported by 
whatever assistance is necessary if he or she chooses to exercise this 
right. But the prognosis is by no means dim for the "young woman 
tragically disappointed in love," for whom the possibility of other, better 
experience is very real ; for "the middle-aged man who has lost his 
family and whose career has been destroyed," for whom the social 
prognosis may be dim but for whom the medical prognosis is not; or 
for the "depressed teen." It is true that for some teens or mature minors 
the medical prognosis is dim: Teenagers somet imes sutTer terminal 








preservation of life would no longer overri~e. their right to ~e. But 
this is only very rarely the case, and the state s mterest would uniformly 
override any right to die of ordinary lovesick teens. 
Thus, it is clear what Weber's mistake consists in. This mistake is 
the central flaw of the right-to-life movement's use of the slippery-slope 
argument, and it is what leads to such outlandish claims. It is in 
conceiving of the right to die as an absolute right, overrideable in no 
way. Were this the case, it would indeed spread as he fears . But this 
is not the case. Like other fundamental constitutional rights, on the 
contrary, it would be overridden in the face of a compelling state 
interest-in this case, a compelling state interest in the preservation 
ofHfe or cognitive life. The principal difference between this right and 
other fundamental constitutional rights is that this one is routinely 
overridden until the end of life, where the prognosis dims (though this 
may occur in adulthood or childhood), whereas others (e.g. , free asso-
ciation, freedom of worship, freedom of speech) are typically not over-
ridden throughout the course of adulthood. But this difference does not 
entail that an active, positive right to die cannot be considered a fun-
damental moral right, or, indeed, a constitutional one. Furthermore, 
there is no sound reason to suppose that recognition of a true right to 
die would have either the legal or the eventual social consequences 
Weber so fearsomely predicts, and thus there is no reason to suppress 
recognition of this right. The wild predictions he makes are not just 
alarmist,.. in that they have no basis in the law; they are dangerous, 
too, in that they would serve to support the suppression of an important, 
fundamental human right. 
Notes 
I A longer eIpoaition of the aame a rgument can be found in Marren, O'Dowd, Crone, 
and Balch, S uicide: A Constitutional Right? 24 Duq. Law Rev. 1, 1- 243 (l9M). 
2 Weber does not make dear whether he hall in mind a constitutional right or a 
fundamental col1l!lt itulional right. Indeed, it remains an open question whether an active 
right to d ie could be shown to be a const itutional right at a ll , since a lthough a passive 
right to die can dearly be derived from the penumbral constitutional right of privacy, 
an active right to die is more plausibly derived from the common· law right of individual 
self-determination. In any Calle, an active right to die is, in my view, a fundamental 
moral right that should be dearly recognized and protected by the law. I interpret 
Weber's assumption concerning an active constitutional right w die as the assumption 
that it would be a fundamental constitutional right , since this gives 88 much strength 
as possible to the argument he is pursuing. 
